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In this paper we propose an emotion assimilation function of sleep and dreaming.
We offer explanations both for the mechanisms by which waking-life memories are
initially selected for processing during sleep, and for the mechanisms by which those
memories are subsequently transformed during sleep. We propose that emotions
act as a marker for information to be selectively processed during sleep, including
consolidation into long term memory structures and integration into pre-existing
memory networks; that dreaming reflects these emotion assimilation processes; and
that the associations between memory fragments activated during sleep give rise to
measureable elements of dream metaphor and hyperassociativity. The latter are a direct
reflection, and the phenomenological experience, of emotional memory assimilation
processes occurring during sleep. While many theories previously have posited a
role for emotion processing and/or emotional memory consolidation during sleep
and dreaming, sleep theories often do not take enough account of important dream
science data, yet dream research, when conducted systematically and under ideal
conditions, can greatly enhance theorizing around the functions of sleep. Similarly,
dream theories often fail to consider the implications of sleep-dependent memory
research, which can augment our understanding of dream functioning. Here, we
offer a synthesized view, taking detailed account of both sleep and dream data
and theories. We draw on extensive literature from sleep and dream experiments
and theories, including often-overlooked data from dream science which we believe
reflects sleep phenomenology, to bring together important ideas and findings from both
domains.
Keywords: sleep, dreaming, emotion, memory, hyperassociativity, metaphor
Aims of the Paper
The ways in which our emotions function (or malfunction) in waking life are greatly aﬀected
by sleep. For example, sleep beneﬁts the consolidation of emotional memories, and enables us
to regulate our emotional reactions (see Emotion-Processing Theories of Sleep). Many theories,
of both sleep functioning and of dream functioning, exist to account for the large body of
data demonstrating the importance of sleep and dreaming for waking-life emotions. However,
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often these theories suﬀer from a lack of integration: theories
of sleep do not adequately consider dream research data,
and theories of dreaming do not adequately consider
sleep research data. Though recently there has been some
evidence of a move toward a more integrative approach
(e.g., Payne, 2010; Perogamvros et al., 2013; Wamsley, 2013,
2014) sleep and dream theories tend to remain relatively
disparate. One of the potential barriers is the skepticism with
which dream reports are sometimes viewed; but recently
researchers have argued that (a) dream reports are transparent
accounts of dream experiencing (Windt, 2013), and (b)
dreams are direct reﬂections of sleep processes (e.g., Payne,
2010; Wamsley, 2013, 2014). As such we argue that greater
attention should be paid to dream research and theorizing,
as dreams can provide phenomenological accounts of sleep
processes.
On the basis of neuroscientiﬁc and behavioral data we propose
an emotion assimilation function sleep and dreaming, whereby
emotions act as a marker for the salience of a memory, thus
prioritizing its subsequent consolidation. Emotional memories
are then strengthened and assimilated into existing memory
schemas during sleep, resulting in memory transformations
such as creativity, insight, and gist extraction. An outcome of
this process may also be the amelioration of the emotional
intensity of the memory. We argue that dreams can be
seen to reﬂect these sleep-dependent mental processes. Our
proposed theory attempts to decipher explicitly both one of
the mechanisms by which a to-be-remembered item may be
selected for subsequent consolidation during sleep (emotional
intensity), and further some of the possible mechanisms
by which the items may be subsequently assimilated into
the wider memory schema, as reﬂected by dream content
(metaphor and hyperassociativity/bizarreness). We review an
extensive body of literature and evidence from the sleep and
dreaming ﬁelds to explore the eﬀects of sleep on emotional
functioning. By critiquing current theories we consider what
any new approach needs to achieve in order to ﬁt the
data across neuroscientiﬁc, behavioral, lab-based and home
dream recall domains (Desseilles et al., 2011). Our theory
is proposed as a function of sleep and dreaming, rather
than the function of sleep and dreaming: we recognize that
there are likely to be many functions of sleep and dreaming,
and that the theory likely will not account for all types of
dreaming.
In the following sections we: (1) review some emotion-
processing theories of sleep; (2) review some emotion-processing
theories of dreaming; (3) consider some arguments for
and against currently existing emotion-processing theories of
dreaming, noting in particular what the existing theories lack;
(4) outline our proposal for an emotion assimilation function of
sleep and dreaming; and (5) consider two of the mechanisms that
we believe underlie emotion assimilation: metaphor generation
and hyperassociative thinking. Finally, we suggest some ideas
for future directions and draw conclusions about our emotion
assimilation theory. Throughout we focus on data from human
rather than animal studies and consequently draw conclusions
relevant to human functioning.
Emotion-Processing Theories of Sleep
Sleep and Emotional Reactivity
Evidence abounds for the importance of sleep for emotional
functioning in waking life. For instance, studies have found
that sleep beneﬁts emotional reactivity in waking life: sleep
deprivation increases reactivity to negative stimuli (Franzen et al.,
2009), to anger and fear emotions (Gujar et al., 2010), and
indeed also to positive stimuli (Gujar et al., 2011). The latter
indicates an overall overreactivity to emotional stimuli following
sleep deprivation, suggesting a general modulating eﬀect of
sleep on emotions. A review of insomnia and emotions found
that insomnia is associated with various mood disorders (e.g.,
depression and anxiety) and heightened emotional reactivity
(Baglioni et al., 2010). Additionally there is compelling evidence
that the hormones cortisol and epinephrine contribute to the
selective processing of emotional material during sleep (Cahill
and Alkire, 2003; Payne and Nadel, 2004), with levels being
particularly heightened during REM.
Evidence such as this has led to several theories suggesting that
a function of sleep includes emotion regulation or processing.
Walker’s (2009) review concluded that REM sleep facilitates the
recall of emotional memories, whilst simultaneously reducing the
emotional impact. One particularly pertinent study found that
the hippocampus (for memory) and the amygdala (for emotion)
are both more active when participants are shown emotional
compared to neutral stimuli, but when shown the same material
months later only the hippocampus is more active (Dolcos et al.,
2005), suggesting the memory is strengthened for recall, but
emotional reactivity is weakened. Walker hypothesized that this
process occurs during sleep, and thus sleep loss results in long-
term aﬀective issues, such as chronic anxiety. Walker and van der
Helm’s (2009) ‘Sleep to remember, sleep to forget’ hypothesis adds
to this theory that if this amelioration of emotions is not achieved
on the ﬁrst night, the process will continue on subsequent nights.
Thus, the process occurs in three stages: memory consolidation,
memory integration, and emotion amelioration. Further, sleep
may prepare the individual for next-day emotional functioning,
as proposed by Goldstein and Walker (2014), whose model
focused on circadian (i.e., circa 24-h) rhythms.
However, there are also some conﬂicting results in studies
investigating the eﬀect of sleep on mood. One study found
that sleep deprivation alleviates depressive symptoms (Vogel
et al., 1975), and the same was found also in a study with
a non-depressed sample, for whom deprivation was related
to emotional adaptation to a negative stimulus (Lara-Carrasco
et al., 2009); these ﬁndings suggest that it is the lack of sleep,
rather than the presence of it, that enhances emotion regulation.
Vandekerckhove and Cluydts (2010) theory, which draws similar
conclusions to those cited above, includes also a suggestion that
can account for such disparate ﬁndings. The authors suggest
that emotional disorders such as depression may be due to an
overstimulation of sleep processes (such as greater amygdala
activation, higher amounts of REM sleep, and more negative
aﬀect in dreams), which results in an excessive emotional
response, particularly to negative stimuli. This would explain
why sleep deprivation beneﬁts depressed individuals. Although
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this does not directly explain why sleep deprivation also beneﬁts
non-depressed individuals, it may be speculated that during
the ﬁrst night following exposure to a negative stimulus, sleep
overstimulation (in response to the stimulus) may result in lack
of adaptation, and thus deprivation aids adaptation; but perhaps
on following nights the trend would be reversed as sleep adjusts
to the stimulus, and then sleep may aid further adaptation. This
is in line with Walker’s (2009) idea that the process occurs
over multiple nights until adaptation is achieved. A similar
model has been espoused in relation to dream incorporation
of negative stimuli, the Disruption-Avoidance-Adaptation model
(Wright and Koulack, 1987), which will be explored further later,
in Section “Wright and Koulack: The Disruption-Avoidence-
Adaption Model.”
Sleep and Emotional Memory Consolidation
Studies have also found that sleep is beneﬁcial for emotional
memory consolidation. For instance, recall of emotional stimuli
has been shown to be better after sleep than wakefulness (Hu
et al., 2006); this is especially true for late-night, rapid-eye-
movement- (REM-) rich sleep (Wagner et al., 2004), although
recent evidence has demonstrated the complementary roles of
both slow-wave sleep and REM (Cairney et al., 2014). Similarly,
emotionally related items are recalled more than neutral
items following sleep using a false memory task (Horton and
Knott, unpublished manuscript). Sleep also ‘unbinds’ waking-life
stimuli, selectively consolidating emotional rather than neutral
aspects of it, both over the course of a night and during a nap
(Payne et al., 2008, 2015).
On the basis of such lines of evidence as these, several
researchers have argued that sleep is integral to emotional
memory consolidation (e.g., Stickgold et al., 2001; Payne, 2010;
Wamsley and Stickgold, 2011). This theory of sleep, thought to
be reﬂected in dreams (Wamsley, 2014), is somewhat divergent
from the emotion-processing theories of sleep and dreams, in that
instead of waking-life emotional experiences being dreamt of in
order to regulate or process emotions, these memory-centered
theories focus on the integration of memories. According to
these theories the meaning of an experience is extracted, the
overall ‘gist’ of the memory rather than speciﬁc details are
consolidated for recall and use, the emotionally salient rather
than the neutral aspects of a memory are strengthened for recall
but the emotion itself is dampened, and the memory is ‘unbound’
to enable memories to be reorganized in novel and creative ways,
which facilitates creative thinking during wakefulness. Thus,
it is a theory of the assimilation and reordering of emotional
experiences, rather than the regulation or processing per se; but
assimilation includes the dampening of emotions as a natural
corollary of the process, and indeed perhaps is one (of many) of
the functions of the process.
Stickgold and Walker (2013), in their ‘triage’ theory argue
that it is now “incontrovertible” (p. 139) that a sleep-dependent
memory consolidation process exists; but what remains to be
discovered is how we decide which memories are selected
for consolidation during sleep. They postulate that stimuli are
reviewed at the point of encoding, and ‘tagged’ if deemed
suﬃciently salient and relevant for future use. Three ways
in which such information may be tagged are suggested: the
emotional intensity of the experience, the future relevance of
the experience (e.g., knowing that the information will be useful
for a reward or a test later), and the deliberate intention to
retain the information. Once the item has been selected for
consolidation, two main processes then occur: item integration,
in which newly learnt memories are assimilated into pre-existing
memory schemas, and multi-item generalization, in which new
items are combined into a new schema. We re-visit these ideas in
relation to emotional processing in Section “Emotion-Processing
Theories of Dreaming” shortly in light of evidence from dream
science.
Mapping Sleep onto Dreams
Sleep is the primary concern of the evidence and theories
discussed so far. However, some researchers do reference dream
research, with some even mapping emotion-processing theories
of sleep onto theories of dreaming (e.g., Walker, 2009; Walker
and van der Helm, 2009; Desseilles et al., 2011). However, such
speculations often rest on an idea of REM sleep speciﬁcally
being related to dreaming, since it is usually REM sleep that
is implicated; or at least, REM sleep being related to a type of
dreaming that is highly emotional, as well as vivid, imagistic,
bizarre, complex, and so on (e.g., van der Helm and Walker,
2012). But as many researchers have shown (e.g., Solms, 2000;
Domhoﬀ, 2003), REM sleep and dreaming are doubly dissociable,
and NREM dreams can take on the typical properties of REM
dreams, especially later in the night (Wamsley et al., 2007; Nir and
Tononi, 2010; Payne, 2010). Thus, emotion-processing theories
of dreaming must look at dream research speciﬁcally, rather
than extrapolating from REM sleep to dreams (see also Desseilles
et al., 2011, for a review of the relationships between brain
processes, sleep and dreaming). In the next section we outline
some emotion-processing theories that are primarily based on
dream research.
Emotion-Processing Theories of
Dreaming
Hartmann: Dreams “Calm the Storm”
One of the best known theories of emotion-processing in
dreaming is that of Hartmann (1996a, 1998, 1999a,b, 2011), who
drew conclusions about emotion-processing during dreaming
from his work with victims of trauma. He argued that dreams
picture waking-life emotions, and that this can be perceived
particularly well in nightmares: for example, feelings of terror,
vulnerability, or guilt might be pictured in what he termed
‘explanatory metaphors’ in dreams, such as being engulfed
by a tidal wave. He suggested that this picturing of waking-
life emotions in dreams enables the emotional memory to be
connected to other related memories already stored in the
dreamer’s mind, in order to reduce the emotional intensity
and distress caused by the experience by comparing it to
other experiences (“calm the storm”); and second, to prepare
the dreamer for any future experiences that might occur. His
theory recalls an earlier stress-mastery theory of dreams (Breger,
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1967), in which it was suggested that we dream of our stressful
waking-life experiences in such a way that the experience is
“symbolically blended” (p. 24) with past memories, which enables
the eventual mastery of the experience; and both of these
earlier dream theories are strikingly similar to Walker and van
der Helm’s (2009), discussed in Section “Sleep and Emotional
Reactivity.” In all three accounts, at least one of the functions of
sleep/dreaming is proposed to be the reduction of the emotional
intensity of waking-life experiences.
Levin and Nielsen: The AMPHAC/AND Model
A similar proposal has been made by Levin and Nielsen
(2007, 2009), Nielsen and Lara-Carrasco (2007), Levin et al.
(2010), but with the emphasis on the reduction of fear
emotions speciﬁcally, in their AMPHAC/ANDmodel. According
to the model, the dreaming process works in three stages:
memory-element activation, in which memory elements (as
opposed to intact memories) are activated; memory-element
recombination, in which memory-elements are re-organized into
a narrative; and emotional expression, which is often fear. As
in Hartmann’s and Breger’s theories in the previous section,
there is the suggestion that the new (emotional) memories are
compared with other memories in order to recombine them
into something new. In the AMPHAC/AND model, this is the
reason for dream bizarreness: the recombination of memory-
elements makes dreams bizarre, because it incorporates disparate
elements of memory and blends them together. The authors
further suggest that when the process dysfunctions, disturbed
dreaming (nightmares and bad dreams) occur, and it can also
fail when the memory-elements are not recombined in novel
ways but in ways that have already been experienced, which
leads to recurrent dreaming. They further note that current
situation and individual diﬀerences aﬀect how well this process
can function; nightmares are more likely when the individual
experiences greater ‘aﬀect load’ (amount of stressful/emotional
experiences) and ‘aﬀect distress’ (the predisposition toward such
experiences being problematic), which vary as a product of
situation and personality. These important ideas will be explored
later.
Revonsuo: The Threat Simulation Theory of
Dreaming
Another theory that proposes, like Hartmann, that dreaming
prepares the dreamer for future experiences is Revonsuo (2000),
Valli et al. (2005) Threat Simulation Theory (TST) of dreaming.
This is an evolutionary explanation of dreaming, supported by
a large amount of data concerning nightmares, the prevalence
of fear in dreams, and the repetitive nature of some dream
acts. The TST proposes that dreaming provides an opportunity
to rehearse possible outcomes that may be useful to survival
during wakefulness. One of the central propositions of the TST
is that dreams are not an accurate reﬂection of waking reality,
but rather are biased toward threatening experiences. Whilst
the disproportionately high presence of negative emotions have
been demonstrated in a large sample of dreams (Hall and Van
de Castle, 1966), systematically sampled and self-rated dream
reports indicate that emotions in dreams are more varied and
balanced (Schredl and Doll, 1998; Sikka et al., 2014); however, the
TST may still apply to the subset of dreams that represent threat
and fear emotions.
Cartwright: The Emotion Regulation Function
of Dreaming
Cartwright (2011), on the basis of her extensive work with
divorced individuals (e.g., Cartwright et al., 1984, 2001, 2006;
Cartwright, 1991), also proposed an emotion-regulation function
of dreaming. She proposed that if we experience negative waking-
life experiences and dream of those experiences in speciﬁc
ways, such as with negative emotions and with time variance
(dreams set in the past, present, and future), then we are more
likely to show improvement on coping with those experiences
than if we do not dream of them or dream of them in the
wrong way, such as with neutral emotions or without time
variance (dreams set exclusively in the past). Similarly, studies
with alcoholics have indicated that dreaming of alcoholism,
particularly in negative tones, is related to recovery (Choi,
1973; Kibira, 1995; Parker and Alford, 2010). Although Lara-
Carrasco et al.’s (2009) study (see Sleep and Emotional Reactivity)
suggested a link between lack of emotional adaptation and the
appearance of negative emotions in dreams, it may be that
this diﬀerence occurred because of the diﬀerent methodologies:
Cartwright’s studies measured naturalistic stimuli over long time
periods, whereas Lara-Carrasco et al. (2009) used a stimulus-
manipulation paradigm over a single night. It may be that the
emotion-regulation function is only eﬀective for naturalistic,
salient, and/or long-lasting waking-life experiences such as
divorce. This is in line with Walker’s (2009) assertion that
emotion amelioration may not be achieved on the ﬁrst night
but may require several nights of processing: it may be that
incorporation initially has detrimental eﬀects on adaptation,
but, longer-term, incorporation is beneﬁcial. This is what
is proposed by the next model by Wright and Koulack
(1987).
Wright and Koulack: The
Disruption-Avoidance-Adaptation Model
Wright and Koulack’s (1987) model was designed to account
for apparently contradictory ﬁndings relating to dream
incorporation of emotional waking-life experiences and
adaptation to those experiences. In the Disruption-Avoidance-
Adaptationmodel, it is suggested that incorporation (disruption),
non-incorporation (avoidance), and ﬁnally adaptation are all
points along a dream adaptation continuum. First, a stressor
is experienced in waking life, and this disrupts sleep and so
is incorporated into a dream. This is not necessarily adaptive,
in line with the ﬁndings that incorporation on the ﬁrst night
after exposure to a negative stimulus is related to maladaptation
(Lara-Carrasco et al., 2009), but is a point along a continuum that
may eventually lead to adaptation. Secondly, the dream avoids
that material or complements it in some way, for the purposes of
re-ﬁnding emotional homeostasis. Disruption/incorporation and
avoidance/non-incorporation may then oscillate for as long as
necessary until the material is mastered. This last point puts the
model on similar ground to theories noted earlier that suggest
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the process is long term and iterative. It may be that this model
is related to the ﬁndings regarding the ‘dream-lag eﬀect,’ which
shows that waking-life experiences – particularly personally
signiﬁcant ones – are incorporated into dreams on the ﬁrst night
after having been experienced, and then again around 5–7 days
later, and the second time they appear they are more abstract
(Nielsen and Powell, 1992; Blagrove et al., 2011b; van Rijn
et al., 2015). These periods of incorporation, non-incorporation,
and re-incorporation with more abstraction may reﬂect the
disruption-avoidance-adaptation process postulated by Wright
and Koulack (1987) and – potentially – the processes of memory
stabilization, elaboration and consolidation as proposed by
Walker (2005). Wright and Koulack (1987) further note that
this process only occurs for stressors that are potent enough
not to be able to be dealt with by the waking brain alone;
benign stressors may be mastered during wakefulness and so
do not need incorporation into dreams for mastery to occur
there.
Convergences between the Theories
There are some clear similarities between the theories,
both of sleep and of dreaming: emotion-processing during
sleep/dreaming is a long-term, iterative process involving both
incorporation and non-incorporation of emotional material,
and the process involves the stages of memory activation
during sleep and dreaming, recombination of those memories
(associatively with other memories and with imagination), and
ﬁnally emotional adaptation. In the next section we consider
a number of arguments in favor of and against the emotion-
processing theories outlined here. The arguments in favor of
the theories that come from sleep research have been noted in
Section “Emotion-Processing Theories of Sleep” and will not be
repeated here.
Arguments for and Against
Emotion-Processing Theories
Arguments for Emotion-Processing Theories
of Dreaming
We Preferentially Dream of Emotional Waking-Life
Experiences
As a starting point, it is necessary for any emotion-processing
theory of dreaming to show that we preferentially dream of our
emotional waking-life experiences over neutral experiences, since
if we dream of emotional and neutral waking-life experiences
equally it would be more diﬃcult to argue that dreams serve
a speciﬁc emotion-processing function. Several studies have
demonstrated the tendency for dreams to reﬂect emotional
experiences from waking life (Schredl, 2006; Horton et al.,
2011; Horton, 2012; Malinowski and Horton, 2014a), and
a wealth of content analysis studies indicate that dreams
generally reﬂect waking-life concerns (e.g., Domhoﬀ, 2003).
Whilst this could be accounted for by a recall bias, systematically
sampled dream reports still show this trend (Schredl and Doll,
1998). Moreover, waking-life experiences that are incorporated
into dreams are more emotional than those that are not
incorporated (Schredl, 2006; Malinowski and Horton, 2014a).
Thus, it can be said quite conclusively that waking-life
emotions tend to be incorporated into dreams, and with
more frequency than waking-life experiences that are less
emotional.
Emotional Intensity is a Marker for Recall
Since we know that dreams preferentially incorporate emotional
experiences, it then follows to query what purpose emotionality
may serve. It is known that emotion is important for memory
recall: for example, memories that are emotional are even
easier to recall than memories that have been speciﬁcally
attempted to be remembered (Heuer and Reisberg, 1990).
Similarly, emotional memories (regardless of valence) are
recalled better than neutral ones (although there are diﬀerential
eﬀects for negative and positive emotions: Kensinger, 2009).
Walker (2009) notes that emotional memories are retained,
though the emotion itself is reduced over time. The reason
for this may be that it is useful to have an emotional reaction
to a stimulus initially in order to gage which experiences
should be recalled and which forgotten, but not to retain
those emotional reactions alongside the memory. That is,
emotions are a useful signiﬁer for tagging memories to be
remembered – for example, to avoid negative experiences
and repeat positive ones – but it would be detrimental to
keep experiencing the emotions each time the memory
is activated. Thus, emotional reactions to experiences are
an instant, automatic way of alerting ourselves to the
importance of those experiences. This aligns with Stickgold
and Walker’s (2013) triage theory, in which they suggest
that salient information is ‘tagged’ for consolidation by
emotional arousal, future relevance, and/or deliberate
intention.
Further evidence for this claim comes from the Fading Aﬀect
Bias (FAB; Walker and Skowronski, 2009; Ritchie et al., 2014),
whereby the negative emotional tone of an autobiographical
memory fades faster over time than the positive emotion.
This has been evidenced to as quickly as 12 h following the
original experience (Gibbons et al., 2011), possibly emerging
following a period of sleep. The FAB has been proposed
to reﬂect positive coping, overcoming past experiences, and
recalling events in line with the current conceptions of the self.
In addition, as we outline later, the heightened emotionality
associated with a memory may signify its importance and need
for consolidation, for ease of subsequent retrieval, with the
emotionality being ameliorated once that purpose has been
achieved. The FAB has been shown to occur in memories for
dreams (Ritchie and Skowronski, 2008), although it remains to
be seen whether dreaming, or sleep, actively contributes to the
eﬀect.
Dreaming of Emotional Waking-Life Experiences is
Related to Subsequent Adaptation
Next, any emotion-processing theory of dreams needs to be
able to demonstrate that dreaming of emotional waking-life
experiences results in improved adaptation to them compared to
non-incorporation. This has been demonstrated in Cartwright’s
laboratory as discussed in Section “Cartwright: The Emotion
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Regulation Function of Dreaming.” She has also studied levels
of depression in non-depressed students pre-sleep and post-
sleep, and linked this with dream content (Cartwright et al.,
1998). Students with moderate scores on the Proﬁle of Mood
State (POMS) scale for depression had three time as many
negative dreams at the start of the night than toward the end
and exhibited a signiﬁcant reduction in depression scores from
night to morning, whereas students with low scores had equal
numbers of positive and negative dreams and no alteration in
scores from night to morning. This accords with her ﬁnding that
among depressed divorcees, participants who had more negative
dreams at the beginning and fewer at the end were more likely to
have been in remission at follow-up 1 year later than those who
hadmore negative dreams and the end and fewer at the beginning
of the night. Thus, in addition to the studies discussed earlier,
it has been shown that progressive dreaming across the night
(negative to positive) is related to improved mood, both short-
term and long-term, in both a depressed and a non-depressed
sample.
Summary of the Evidence for Emotion-Processing
Theories of Dreams
Thus these pieces of evidence show that: (1) dreams preferentially
incorporate emotional experiences; (2) emotional experiences
are more likely to be recalled than neutral ones; (3) sleep may
facilitate the amelioration of emotional experiences; and (4) there
is a relationship between incorporating emotional experiences in
dreams and adapting to those experiences. Taken together, they
provide evidence for emotion-processing theories of sleep and
dreaming, illustrating that emotionality likely ‘tags’ a memory
for recall, and thus such memories appear later in dreams,
perhaps for the function of ameliorating and/or adapting to those
experiences.
Arguments Against the Emotion-Processing
Theories
The Evidence is Correlational, Not Experimental
It has been argued that since Cartwright’s studies were correlation
rather than experimental (the stimuli were not manipulated),
causality cannot be inferred (Blagrove, 1992, 2011): it might
be that, rather than speciﬁc dreams resulting in coping ability,
coping ability may lead to speciﬁc dreams. For example, well-
adapted divorcees might be capable of accepting the negativity
of their situation and thus dream negatively, whereas divorcees
who do not adapt well may be stuck in the past happiness of their
marriage and thus have dreams that are set in the past. Thus, the
dreams may more simply be a carry-over of waking-life coping
mechanisms rather than a coping mechanism outside of wakeful
cognition.
More generally, any relationship between emotional
processing and dreaming of emotional material needs to
be subject to systematic comparisons of dreaming versus
not-dreaming. Some theories of dreaming, such as the TST,
Hartmann’s “calm the storm” and Cartwright’s “emotion
regulation function” theories, emphasize the role of dreaming, as
opposed to sleep per se, in the processing of emotions. Whilst the
other theories use dreams to evidence the processing of emotion
during sleep, they typically do not assume that dreaming is
anything more than a reﬂection of oﬄine processing during
sleep. At present the methods for sampling dreams both in
and out of the laboratory are not yet sophisticated enough
to make such a distinction between sleep with dreaming and
sleep without dreaming, with dream recall being the only
means by which researchers can ﬁnd evidence of having dreamt
(Kahan and Horton, 2012). As such, until eﬀects of dreaming
can be experimentally manipulated, we must draw tentative
conclusions about any function of dreaming as distinct from
a function of having slept. However, some studies have begun
to develop methods for matching improvements in speciﬁc
autobiographical memories with dreams of those precise
experiences, noting that emotional experiences are more likely to
feature in dreams than neutral ones and that those experiences
are preferentially recalled more accurately 2 weeks later (Horton,
2012).
Dream Theories Focus on Different Levels of Inquiry
to Sleep Theories
Following on from this view, any theory of emotion processing
needs to be able to account for the behavioral (as well as
the neuroscientiﬁc) proﬁle of emotion processing in sleep (as
summarized in Section “Emotion-Processing Theories of Sleep”),
as well as in dreaming. At present the theories of emotional
processing in dreams can, in part, explain the preferential
processing of emotional memory (compared to emotionally
neutral memories), but they cannot be mapped onto the
trends concerning the preferential consolidation of emotional
memory following sleep (aside from Horton, 2012, as noted
above). Wamsley’s work exploring the experience of dreaming
alongside memory processing in sleep (Wamsley et al., 2010;
Wamsley, 2014) has been exemplary in attempting to link
these domains, though vast methodological improvements are
required before conclusions can be conﬁdently drawn concerning
the speciﬁc role of dreaming in emotional processing during
sleep.
Valence does not Influence Incorporation
The theories of emotion-processing in Section “Emotion-
Processing Theories of Dreaming” focus speciﬁcally on negative
emotions: Cartwright’s (2011) theory came from work with
individuals going through divorce, Hartmann’s (1996a) theory
was developed from work with trauma victims, Levin and
Nielsen (2007, 2009) focus speciﬁcally on fear extinction, and
Wright and Koulack (1987) on stressful experiences. Thus,
these accounts of dream functioning would suggest that dreams
particularly incorporate particularly negatively emotional, and/or
stressful waking-life experiences. However, this is not the case.
Whilst there is an array of literature concerning negative
emotions in dreams, the evidence from dream science suggests
that experiences typically incorporated into dreams are more
emotionally intense than those that are not incorporated, but
are not speciﬁcally negatively valenced (Schredl and Doll, 1998;
Schredl, 2006; Horton et al., 2011; Malinowski and Horton,
2014a). Some studies indicate that there is a ‘negativity bias’ in
dreams – the tendency for dreams to be more negatively than
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positively valenced (Hall and Van de Castle, 1966; Snyder, 1970;
Nielsen et al., 1991; Domhoﬀ, 1996) – but others have found
a balance between positive and negative emotions in dreams
(Strauch and Meier, 1996; Kahn and Hobson, 2002; St-Onge
et al., 2005). Furthermore, studies that have compared external
ratings of emotions to participants’ self-ratings of emotions ﬁnd
that external raters overestimate negative emotions in dreams
compared to what the dreamers themselves perceive in the
dreams (Schredl and Doll, 1998; Sikka et al., 2014), indicating
that it is the method that produces the negativity bias. In other
studies, the top self-reported emotion has been some form of
joy, elation, or excitement (Howe and Blick, 1983; Fosse et al.,
2001).
In a similar vein, as reported in Section “Emotion-Processing
Theories of Sleep,” sleep deprivation aﬀects not only negative
waking-life emotional reactivity, but positive reactivity too
(Gujar et al., 2011); the authors proposed that sleep loss not
only has detrimental eﬀects on the processing of negative
stimuli, but has bi-directional eﬀects on emotions. Thus,
following this line of evidence, it may be that rather than just
enabling adaptation to negative stimuli, sleep more generally
facilitates lower levels of reactivity to emotional stimuli.
Similarly Carr and Nielsen (2015) have recently found that
participants scored higher on a primed associational breadth
task following REM but not NREM sleep nor a period of
wakefulness, and, moreover, the eﬀect was stronger for positive
over negative stimuli, again demonstrating that positively
valenced experiences need to be taken into consideration when
considering the function of sleep or dreaming on waking life
emotions.
Taking the discussion back to dreams, it may be said then
that incorporating emotional experiences into dreams is either
a reﬂection of or is itself instrumental in this process, through
the assimilation of emotional experiences into the memory
system (though the latter view is particularly challenging to
evidence). The detrimental eﬀects of sleep loss and/or lack of
dream incorporation of emotional stimuli may be more obvious,
more pronounced, and/or of more clinical relevance for negative
stimuli, but the evidence for positive emotions necessitates a
consideration not only of adaptation to negative experiences, but
also a more general discussion of assimilation and amelioration
of all emotional experiences in sleep and dreams. This is what
has been achieved in sleep research theories (see Emotion-
Processing Theories of Sleep), whereby both positive and negative
emotions are accounted for: dream research theories would thus
also beneﬁt from a consideration of such data and theories as
these.
Emotions vs. Stress
Just as there is a lack of evidence for negatively emotional waking-
life experiences being preferentially incorporated into dreams
over positive ones, so there is a lack of evidence for stressful
experiences over non-stressful ones, whereby stressfulness is
conceived of as a speciﬁcally negative and aversive longer-term
response state (Kasl, 1995), as opposed to emotion which can
be negative or positive and which is typically shorter-lived.
Furthermore an emotion may elicit an associated subjective
feeling, and one such recognized feeling is that of stress.
This lack of evidence argues further against some of the
dream theories, which speciﬁcally discuss stressful waking-
life experiences (Breger, 1967; Wright and Koulack, 1987).
While there is some evidence that particularly unusual stressful
experiences such as trauma are dreamt of (see Barrett, 1996;
Punamäki, 2007, for reviews), studies that have measured the
eﬀect of more usual stressful experiences on dreams have
not found the same pattern. Malinowski and Horton (2014a)
measured the emotionality and stressfulness of waking-life
experiences separately, and found that experiences that were
incorporated into dreams were more emotional, but no more
stressful, than those that were not incorporated. Similarly,
Delorme et al. (2002) found no eﬀect of examinations on the
dreams of students, whether the dreams were measured for direct
eﬀect or indirect eﬀect (such as levels of stress or threat emotions
in dreams), even though wakeful stress was higher during the
examination period than a control period, demonstrating again
that stressful experiences do not necessary result in dream
incorporation.
Wright and Koulack’s (1987) model could argue that
examinations are relatively benign and can be adapted to during
wakefulness, and so can account for this discrepancy. Indeed,
some of the other results in Delorme et al. (2002) support
this theory. When looking at students’ coping mechanisms for
the examination period, students who used problem-solving in
waking life did not have incorporations of the examinations,
whereas using positive reappraisal in waking life – making the
problem seem less distressing without solving it – correlated with
problem-solving in dreams. The inference is that incorporation of
a relatively non-stressful experience becomes necessary if it is not
adequately dealt with in waking life. Thus, in this view, it is not
merely the level of stress intensity that determines whether or not
a stressor needs to be incorporated into dreaming in order to be
processed, but also ability to cope with the stressor, highlighting
a role for individual diﬀerences. This will be explored further in
the following section.
Individual Differences
For some individuals, dreaming of negative waking-life
experiences may actually have the opposite eﬀect to mastering
that material, in that it may result in an increase in distress,
rather than a decrease. This is in line with Levin and Nielsen’s
(2007, 2009) assertion that ‘aﬀect distress’ (the predisposition
to be distressed by diﬃcult experiences) mediates whether
the dreaming process is to function or dysfunction (become a
nightmare or bad dream). Though Levin and Nielsen do account
for this factor, many theories do not. Research has shown that
nightmare distress (the amount of distress an individual feels
about having a nightmare) is more strongly related to well-being
than nightmare frequency (Belicki, 1992; Blagrove et al., 2004).
Thus, for some individuals, having highly emotional experiences
leads to dreaming of the experience – and they may also be
predisposed toward such dreams becoming nightmares – and
those dreams/nightmares in turn result in more waking-life
distress. We have found individual diﬀerences that support
this contention: individuals who score highly on neuroticism,
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indicating trait emotional lability, also score highly on a scale that
measures how often their waking-life emotions aﬀect their dream
emotions and vice versa (Malinowski and Horton, unpublished
manuscript).
Waking-life stress has also been shown to relate to
experiencing recurrent dreams: active recurrent-dreamers (but
not past- or non-recurrent dreamers) had more recurrent dreams
in a period leading up to examinations than after (Duke
and Davidson, 2002). If recurrent dreams are a malfunction
of the ‘normal’ assimilation process of dreaming whereby
dream material stagnates and repeats rather than progressing
and processing (as suggested by Levin and Nielsen, 2009),
then this would indicate that for some individuals waking-
life stress results in a malfunction of the dream process
(i.e., an increase in recurrent dreams). Being an active-
recurrent dreamer has also been shown to be related to a
host of waking-life issues summarily described as low levels
of ‘psychological well-being,’ a measure that includes levels of
waking-life depression, stress, and anxiety (Brown and Donderi,
1986). This research strengthens the argument that individual
diﬀerences must be taken into account in considering dream
function.
Individual diﬀerences may also account for Cartwright’s
ﬁndings: individuals who were predisposed toward coping with
their divorce are more likely to have certain types of dreams (such
as with time variance), while those predisposed toward failing to
cope are more likely to have other types (such as stuck in the
past). Indeed, earlier research found that participants who were
high in ‘neuroticism’ had more dreams set in the past than in the
present (Cohen and Cox, 1975). So it may be that predispositions
determine what kind of dream a person will have, rather than the
dream determining a person’s ability to adapt.
Situational Differences
In addition to individual diﬀerences, situational diﬀerences aﬀect
whether incorporation of highly emotional experiences occurs,
or whether non-incorporation follows, and the extent to which
this relates to adaptation. In Levin and Nielsen’s (2007, 2009)
model this is called aﬀect load (amount of stressful or emotional
experiences an individual is experiencing). For example, though
some evidence such as Cartwright’s indicated a potentially
beneﬁcial role for incorporation, Lavie and Kaminer (1996),
who worked with victims of trauma, found that adaptation
was not related to dream incorporation of the trauma but
to repression of it (and an overall repressive coping style).
Thus it may be that higher levels of stress require a repressive
coping style, which includes dream repression, whereas lower
levels of stress may be better served by focusing on the
experiences and mastering them, and therefore includes dream
incorporation. This would suggest a modiﬁcation to Wright
and Koulack to the eﬀect that in addition to benign stressors
resulting in non-incorporation and potent stressors resulting in
incorporation, extreme potent stressors may also result in non-
incorporation: which in this case is synonymous with repression.
As Walker (2009) notes, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
may constitute a malfunction of the decoupling of memory and
emotion process; in which case, repression may be the only
viable coping mechanism. Punamäki (2007) notes that dream
recall may either increase or decrease after traumatic experiences,
perhaps again illustrating that diﬀerent methods of coping may
be used by diﬀerent people according to the situation and
individual.
Similarly, studies have shown that the content of traumatic
dreams varies depending on the type of trauma experienced and
the stage of recovery. Regarding the type of trauma experienced, it
has been found that traumatized individuals with direct military
experience of war havemore direct, unambiguous, and replicative
dreams of their experiences, while traumatized civilians have
more indirect, ‘symbolic,’ and non-replicative incorporations
(Schreuder et al., 1998, 2000). Thus, stressors of all levels of
intensity may lead to incorporation but those with lower levels
may be harder to detect because they are symbolic. Regarding
the stage of recovery, Hartmann (1996b), Wilmer (1996), both
working with Vietnam veterans, found that there were three types
of traumatic dreams experienced by these individuals: apparently
veridical replays of war experiences; variable nightmares that
pictured plausible scenarios that did not actually occur; and
hallucinatory nightmares that were like ‘ordinary’ nightmares,
including material from the previous day. These three types of
nightmares were believed to be sequential and indicated stage
of recovery: as the trauma of war was adapted to, the dreams
become less veridical and more like ordinary dreams (that is,
bizarre and symbolic). These studies again show that dream
incorporation of, and adaptation to, highly stressful experiences
is dependent on various factors, including type of stress and stage
of recovery. Hartmann’s and Wilmer’s suggestion that dreams
are repetitive but become more bizarre as recovery is made
may be empirical evidence for the aforementioned assertion
of many of the theories that the process is long-term and
iterative.
While many of the emotion-processing theories suggest, with
Walker (2009), that PTSD dreaming is a malfunction of the
‘normal’ dreaming process (such as Hartmann, 1996b) and
account for the change in dreams and adaptation to the trauma
by postulating the dreamwork as a long-term, iterative process,
they do not attempt to explain what it is that has malfunctioned:
why dreams become repetitive and literal, and therefore unable to
serve their emotional memory-assimilation process. We address
this issue in Section “The Emotion Assimilation Theory of Sleep
and Dreaming,” where we suggest that PTSD dreams are a
malfunction of the ‘normal’ dreaming process due to the stunting
of imagination, which is the driving force of the quality of dreams
(such as bizarre, hyperassociative, andmetaphorical) required for
‘normal’ dreaming, which involves the assimilation of emotional
memories.
Taken together, the existing theories of emotion processing
in both sleep and dreaming share the view that emotion acts
as a marker of the importance of an experience, signifying the
need for further processing. The reasons for such processing
and the mechanisms underlying it have been disputed. We
next attempt to synthesize the evidence from both the sleep-
and dream-processing ﬁelds, in proposing a new theory of
emotional memory assimilation during sleep, as evidenced by
dream phenomenology.
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The Emotion Assimilation Theory of
Sleep and Dreaming
In line with sleep and memory researchers (e.g., Payne, 2010;
Wamsley and Stickgold, 2011), we propose that emotional
waking-life memories are preferentially activated during sleep,
thus appearing in dreams, in order to assimilate these memories
into the wider memory system. This serves several purposes: (i)
consolidation, which is the strengthening and stabilization of the
memory (with emotional memories preferentially selected); (ii)
assimilation into the memory system, which is the integration
of new memories with past memories, expectations for the
future, and imagination; (iii) the creation of abstractions
and generalizations from the memory; (iv) the generation of
creativity, insight, novel ideas, and also problem-solving; and (v)
emotion amelioration.
The process diﬀers depending on the type of situation, the
stage in which the process is in, and according to individual
diﬀerences. Adaptation is something thatmay occur as a product
of incorporation and assimilation, but this will vary depending
on trait diﬀerences, the type of waking-life experience, the
intensity of the associated emotionality, the wider situation the
individual is currently in, their history, the content of the dream,
and probably many other factors. Thus, though some kinds of
incorporation have been shown to relate to adaptation, in some
individuals such as those who score highly on the personality
trait ‘neuroticism,’ incorporation may lead to further emotional
unbalance rather than adaptation such that waking-life emotions
aﬀect dream emotions and dream emotions in turn aﬀect waking
mood. Similarly in some circumstances, such as trauma, extreme
emotions can result in non-incorporation (repression), which is,
in this situation, necessary for coping. Additionally incorporation
may only relate to adaptation when dream content contains
speciﬁc properties, such as time variance instead of being set in
the past.
We propose that the process of assimilating emotional
waking-life experiences during sleep and dreaming into pre-
existing networks and schemas requires imaginational abilities:
for sleep and dreaming to achieve this function, individuals
must be able to conjure experiences appearing in dreams during
sleep in speciﬁc ways, as will be explained in the next section.
In the immediate term, information that has been encountered
during the day needs to be assessed in terms of its importance
and potential future use. The vast amount of stimuli perceived
and experienced renders this process somewhat arduous, so
emotional information and experiences are ﬁrst and foremost
processed. These emotional experiences are activated during
sleep, giving rise to a predictable pattern of dream behaviors.
Over time, the emotional stimuli are re-activated in slightly
diﬀerent contexts, as part of the assimilation process. This means
that they are better remembered in the short term, the associated
emotional intensity is reduced over time during assimilation, and
the salient information from the experience is embedded into
stable networks for eﬀective and rapid retrieval when needed.
For this to happen, information, and experiences need
to be activated repeatedly and in a range of manifestations
(Lewis and Durrant, 2011; Horton and Malinowski, 2015).
We outline the methods by which this occurs, via dreaming,
for emotional material in particular. The clearest way of
perceiving how this functions in healthy individuals is to look
to the malfunction of the ‘normal’ process: that is, to look at
dreams following traumatic experiences. This follows Hartmann’s
(1999b) argument that the nightmare is the best type of dream
to look at when contemplating dream functioning. As discussed
earlier, PTSD dreaming involves the literal replaying of the
traumatic experience(s) during sleep, and the literalness of
the replaying decreases as adaptation increases. Concomitantly
the bizarreness and symbolism, and the associativity with
other waking-life experiences, increase also. Underlying these
abilities to create bizarre scenarios and metaphors and to make
associations between disparate memories is the ability to imagine
and to create novel thoughts, and this is the crux of the process.
When a person experiences a trauma, their ability to imagine is
stunted: not only are PSTD dreams literal rather than bizarre and
symbolic, but waking-life imaginational abilities are diminished
as well, such as the appearance of more general, and less
speciﬁc, autobiographical memories (Moore and Zoellner, 2007),
including when for when imagining the future (Brown et al.,
2012). Furthermore, therapeutic treatments that aim to kick-
start imaginational abilities such as Image Rehearsal Therapy
(e.g., Krakow et al., 2001) and Focusing-Oriented Dreamwork
(Ellis, 2013, 2014) have been shown to reduce PSTD nightmare
occurrence and PTSD symptoms.
The more usual (non-clinical) types of repetitively dreaming
of the same concern – recurrent dreams and repetitive dream
themes – indicate a similar but less heightened malfunction of the
‘normal’ dreaming process; i.e., the experience is not adequately
assimilated into the memory system and so is activated over and
over again until assimilation is achieved (e.g., Domhoﬀ, 1993;
Zadra, 1996; Hartmann, 1998). This is the view also of Levin
and Nielsen (2007, 2009) who argue that recurrent dreams are
an example of disturbed dreaming, and are a malfunction of
the healthy dreaming process. PTSD nightmares and recurrent
dreams are variously perceived by researchers either to be an
extreme version of normal dreaming (e.g., Domhoﬀ, 1993), or
a failure of the normal dream process (e.g., Hartmann, 1998;
Levin andNielsen, 2007, 2009); however, if the trajectory of PTSD
dreams is considered, it can be seen that both of these positions
are possible: initially the PTSD dream is a malfunction of the
normal dream process in that it repetitively fails to be assimilated,
but as the trauma is adapted to the dreams change to become
more like ‘normal’ dreaming, and so in this sense can be seen
as being at the extreme end of the spectrum of dreaming, and
that end-of-the-spectrum is synonymous with a failure of the
process.
The imagination abilities that are required for ‘normal’
dreaming and which are greatly reduced following trauma,
include (but likely are not limited to) the ability to generate
metaphors, and the ability to make wide associations between
disparate memories (hyperassociativity), which, during sleep
and dreaming, are lived, immersive experiences engaging the
whole body. These two aspects of imagination are evidenced in
dreaming, and, moreover, there is evidence that these kinds of
thinking during sleep are associated with the type of creative
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thinking required to problem-solve and adapt to experiences. In
the following section we consider each of these imaginational
abilities in turn.
Metaphors
Metaphors (“statements of non-literal reality”: Tourangeau and
Rips (1991, p. 453) for waking life in dreams are often
acknowledged to exist but rarely studied in dream science
owing to the extreme methodological diﬃculties in broaching
the subject (e.g., Bulkeley and Kahan, 2008). Nevertheless, many
of the world’s leading researchers historically and currently
subscribe to the notion that dreams can be metaphors for
waking life, picturing waking-life experiences and emotions in
non-literal, ﬁgurative ways (e.g., Jung, 1948a,b; Lakoﬀ, 1993;
Hartmann, 1996a; Domhoﬀ, 2003). Some common agreements
between researchers exist, including: dream metaphors picture
abstract concepts in concrete terms; these metaphors are
specialized to the dreamer and thus to understand the metaphor
it is necessary to elicit the input of the dreamer; and emotions
guide the metaphorical imagery of the dream (e.g., Freud, 1900;
Jung, 1948a; Hall, 1953; Lakoﬀ, 1993; Hartmann, 1996a, 1999a,b;
Kunzendorf, 2007).
Evidence of Dream Metaphors
To take an example from research, in an interview study we
discussed with participants many aspects of dreams that were
metaphors for their waking life, such as one participant’s dream
of the ‘Starship Enterprise’ taking oﬀ from Earth representing her
new entrepreneurial career ‘taking oﬀ,’ and another participant
who dreamt of a demon being released as representing the release
of his own ‘inner demon’ (Malinowski et al., 2014). These dreams
conformed to the three agreed elements of dream metaphors
above: they concretely pictured something abstract from waking
life; they were about emotional aspects of their life; and it was
necessary to talk in detail with the dreamer about what was going
on currently in their life in order to understand the metaphor.
Among some other of the more convincing dream metaphor
anecdotes in dream research are dreams that clearly ﬁguratively
reference some waking-life intrusion during sleep, such as the
snake coiling round a participant’s leg in their dream while a
pressure cuﬀ was being inﬂated around their leg (Nielsen et al.,
1993), and the participant who dreamt of a bee making a nest
in her hair while she slept with EEG electrodes stuck in her hair
(Strauch and Meier, 1996).
In addition to these, studies that make use of inductive
qualitative methods and follow these up with quantitative
methods (blind content analysis) can demonstrate metaphors
in dreams. Bulkeley and Bulkeley (2005) noticed that among a
group of individuals diagnosed with terminal illnesses dream
content often referred to a journey, which the authors inferred
was a metaphorical representation of the journey toward death.
Some years later in an unrelated study, Bulkeley (2012) found
while blind coding a series of dreams that there were an
unusual number of transport dreams, and from this and other
clues estimated that they came from a similar group of people;
the dreams were indeed from a group of older palliative care
patients.
Functions of Metaphor Generation: Novelty
Metaphor theorists have considered the various ways in which
metaphors work: for example, they may simply emphasize
the similarity between two things; or, alternatively, they may
enable something new to be discovered from the comparison
(Tourangeau and Sternberg, 1982). Tourangeau and Rips (1991)
provided evidence for the latter: metaphor creates an emergent
feature from two previously unrelated things, rather than simply
emphasizing their similarities. Similarly Lakoﬀ and Johnson
(1980), who instigated the current understanding of the ubiquity
of metaphor in our conceptualization of ourselves and our
world, discussed non-conventional metaphors, ones that are not
already in existence and common usage, and noted that they are
‘imaginative,’ and ‘creative,’ and can provide new understandings.
This is perceptible in dream metaphors: for example, the
condensation into one character of a dreamer’s father and
male lover, which enables the dreamer to perceive something
about the lover that previously they did not (Hartmann,
1996a).
Kuiken (1999) similarly argued that the unidirectional method
of interpreting dream metaphors (‘A’ in the dream represents
‘B’ in waking life) is erroneous, and that dreams should be
interpreted rather as a composite image, in which A says
something about B, and B also says something about A.
In this argument also there is an emphasis on novelty, on
the combination of two loosely related concepts to produce
something new that says something about them both. Indeed,
it was found in one study that metaphors created from dream
imagery were more novel than those generated from waking
fantasy imagery, supporting the novelty-producing concept of
dream metaphors (Kuiken and Smith, 1991).
Metaphors and Embodied Cognition
The idea of dreams concretely picturing something abstract from
waking life does not, however, necessitate that the dream is non-
literal, like a spaceship taking oﬀ representing a career taking
oﬀ. Sometimes the concrete representation may be exactly literal,
but the way in which it turns the abstract into the concrete is
by embodying the thought and making it exist on a physical
(albeit imagined) plane. As Hall (1953) wrote, dreams make the
conceptual perceptual; and that percept might be a metaphor, but
equally it might not be. In their book, Hall and Nordby (1972)
discuss the diﬀerence between dreams that are ‘denotive,’ that is,
the dream imagery stands directly in for its referent, and dreams
that are ‘metaphorical,’ in which the dream imagery stands in
for something less obvious, and may express complex, even
contradictory ideas. Denotive dreams do not require any kind
of ‘decoding’ to understand their waking life referent, whereas
metaphorical dreams do. Following the logic of the dream and
metaphor theorists cited above, it is the metaphorical dreams
rather than the denotive dreams that facilitate the making of
new connections, the generation of novel ideas. However, it is
likely that dreams do not exist in this binary way, denotive versus
metaphorical, but that this would be better conceptualized as
a continuum. This idea that dreams are embodied simulations
of thoughts has been championed by many researchers, such as
Domhoﬀ (2011b). In one study he shows how the dreams of a
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widower about his wife concretely picture his emotional journey
after her death (Domhoﬀ, 2007).
Lakoﬀ (1993) notes that metaphors are imagistic – they
use imagery from the physical world to conceptualize its more
abstract parts – but when used in language they are only
pictorial in theory. We do not picture the mental image of
someone’s feet being cold when we talk about having “cold
feet” before a wedding. However, when dreams use metaphors,
they are imagistic; dreams are visual, but even more than
this they are experiential; they are felt, bodily experiences.
Many dream theorists have highlighted the experiential aspect
of dreaming, such as Jung, Rogers, and Gendlin, as discussed
in a recent article by Ellis (2014). In her work, Ellis shows
how re-entering and bodily experiencing a dream can enable
the dreamwork to move forward, perhaps by empowering the
dreamer to “manipulate their internal imagery system.” There are
parallels here between this Focus-Oriented Dreamwork (FOD)
and Gackenbach’s ﬁndings that high-end gamers seem to have
a defense mechanism in their dreams whereby when they have
dreams of being attacked they are able to respond in kind because
they have rehearsed this behavior in waking life (Gackenbach
et al., 2011, 2013). What FOD clients and high-end gamers have
in common is that they have rehearsed their adaptive behaviors
during wakefulness in lived, bodily, immersive experiences,
which then translate into their dream behaviors. Thus, the
embodied, lived experience of the imagination is crucial.
Functions of Metaphor Generation: Assimilation
Through dreaming embodied metaphors, which are guided by
waking emotions, the dreamer is able to assimilate current
waking experiences into their wider memory system, and into
their mind as a whole. This is the assimilation process: not
only are the experiences reactivated in a memory consolidation
fashion, but they are lived in the body through imagination
and in this way assimilated into information already stored in
the brain. This assimilation process is mostly clearly perceived
in the research conducted with PTSD patients as discussed
earlier. That is, PTSD involves emotional trauma, a general
stunting of imagination, and thereby the literal replaying of that
trauma during dreaming; recovery from PTSD involves a gradual
move into metaphoricalness in dreaming. Dreamwork such as
IRT and FOD involves using imagination to change the PTSD
nightmares.
Hartmann (1996a, 1999a,b) suggested that dreams are all
“explanatory metaphors” for some waking-life emotion, and
that this is most obvious in extreme cases such as PTSD
and nightmares; ‘normal’ dreams also do this but it is much
harder to discern the underlying cause. He also showed that
daydreams become more metaphorical the more emotional they
are, becoming like night dreams (Hartmann et al., 2002–2003).
This may at ﬁrst glance seem at odds with the data that show
that dreams become more metaphorical the more adaptation
occurs after a trauma in individuals with PTSD; but if the latter
is viewed as the extreme end of the spectrum, as a malfunction
of the process, it may be speculated that metaphoricalness and
emotionality increase together up to a point, but if the emotion is
so intense that it becomes traumatic then the ability to produce
metaphor fails and is lost, because PTSD stunts imagination.
Indeed, we found a large positive correlation between the self-
reported emotional intensity and metaphoricalness of late-night
dreams (r = 0.50), and a medium one in early night dreams
(r = 0.35; Malinowski and Horton, 2014b). If we interpret these
ﬁndings in line with the emotion assimilation theory, emotion
and metaphor increase together because metaphor generation is
a tool for imaginatively thinking about important experiences,
and emotion denotes importance. Kunzendorf (2007) noted
that one of his participants, who intensiﬁed the emotion in
a reinterpretation of her dream, in so doing gained insight
into it. The intensiﬁcation of the emotion led to insight. The
relationship betweenmetaphor and insight is the focus of the next
section.
Functions of Metaphor Generation: Insight
Dreamwork often relies on the concept that dreams enable us
to ﬁnd out something about ourselves that we don’t already
know (Ellis, 2013); this makes sense in light of the evidence
that dreams can be metaphorical, and that metaphors generate
novel thoughts. This view, however, is in stark contrast to
the beliefs of some researchers who claim that dreams never
tell us anything we don’t already know (e.g., Hobson in his
dialog with Schredl: Hobson and Schredl, 2011). The diﬀerence
perhaps rests on diﬀering notions of what dreams ‘are’: the
self-organization of random neural ﬁrings in the brain (e.g.,
Kahn and Hobson, 1993), or the self-organization of meaningful,
purposeful, patterned ﬁrings of pieces of information with a
tendency toward emotionality that the dreamer is not aware of
but that would be useful to be aware of. Thus it is necessary to
deﬁne what is meant when we say “something we don’t already
know.”
Creative insight is deﬁned as the association of elements of
information already stored in the mind into new conﬁgurations
that are in some way useful (Cai et al., 2009). In Cai et al.’s (2009)
study, the ability to discover associated words in the Remote
Associations Test was signiﬁcantly enhanced by REM (but not
NREM) sleep, when the participants had (unknowingly) been
primed on the answers before sleep. Thus REM sleep facilitated
this associativity ability during subsequent wakefulness. Sleep
processes – and we would argue, the concomitant subjective
experience of dreaming – enabled the hyperassociativity of the
information that was already stored to be used in a creative
and useful way. Similarly, working with dreams has been shown
to generate insight into the self (Edwards et al., 2013, 2015),
and more insight is obtained when participants are asked to
make associations between the dream images and waking life
than when simply richly describing the dream images (or a
combination of the two: Hill et al., 1998). Perhaps then the
idea of dreams telling us “something we don’t already know”
should be restated as “something we are not aware of knowing,”
in which ‘knowing’ may constitute formerly disparate pieces
of information that require reconﬁguring to become useful.
Dreamwork facilitates obtaining insight into these non-conscious
thoughts, perhaps through the unraveling of dream metaphors,
which, as discussed, are potentially particularly useful for making
new discoveries. However, the concept that ‘decoding’ dream
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metaphors can enable the generation of insight currently lacks
empirical evidence, so this idea is very much speculative at
present.
Thus we believe that, despite the diﬃculties in objectively
demonstrating the existence of metaphor in dreams, there is
evidence enough to make the assertion that abstract waking-
life thoughts appear in dreams in concrete ways; sometimes
this concrete representation is ‘denotive,’ that is, a literal
representation, and other times it is ‘metaphorical,’ that is, a non-
literal representation (and variations in between these two states).
These metaphorical representations are guided by emotions,
enable the assimilation of emotions, and have the potential to
generate novel insights, the uncovering of which can be facilitated
by dreamwork. PTSD dreams are an extreme or a malfunction
of this process, and so are not metaphorical at all, until the
recovery process begins, which may be oﬀset by ‘kick-starting’ the
imagination through types of dreamwork speciﬁcally designed
for this purpose.
Hyperassociativity
The intense connectivity between loosely associated memories
(‘hyperassociativity’) that may be behind insight and creativity
during sleep is the second kind of imaginative activity that
occurs particularly during sleep/dreaming, and it is to this that
we now turn. There is wide agreement among researchers that
dreaming, unlike focused waking thought, is hyperconnective,
ﬂuid, and ﬂexible (Antrobus, 1993; Globus, 1993; Montangero,
1993; Hartmann, 1996a; Cai et al., 2009; Levin and Nielsen, 2009;
Walker, 2009; Walker and Stickgold, 2010; Cartwright, 2011;
Llewellyn, 2013). It has something in common with daydreaming
and other loose modes of thinking during wakefulness but
is more extreme than them (Hartmann, 2010; Fox et al.,
2013), and also with the ‘default network’ of the waking brain
(Domhoﬀ, 2011a). Many researchers agree that the dream is
always a novel creation, and is often bizarre because of its
intense interconnectivity (Montangero, 1993; Hartmann, 1996a;
Stickgold and Walker, 2004; Cartwright, 2011).
Evidence of Hyperassociativity in Dream Content
In Stickgold and Walker’s (2013) triage theory, it was suggested
that once memories have been selected for incorporation, two
main processes then occur during sleep: item integration, in
which newly learnt memory representations are assimilated
into pre-existing schemas; and multi-item generalization, in
which new items are combined into a new schema. It is
this latter process that is particularly of relevance here:
this multi-item generalization stage may be reﬂected in
dreams as hyperassociativity. At this subjective, dream level,
hyperassociativity is reﬂected in at least three ways. First,
dreams do not replay waking-life experiences ‘intact’ but rather
incorporate them in fragmentary ways, with disparate elements
of waking life appearing in one dream narrative (Fosse et al.,
2003; Malinowski and Horton, 2014c; Horton and Malinowski,
2015). One study found that 81% of dreams contained abrupt
and complete changes of dream events within the dream
narrative (Montangero, 2012). During this hyperassociative
process, episodic memories are “unbound” or “disconnected”
(Payne, 2010, p. 122). The second way in which dreams reﬂect
hyperassociativity is in their bizarreness: disparate, disjointed
elements of memory join (associate) together with imagination to
form bizarre narratives (e.g., Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002; Levin
and Nielsen, 2007; Montangero, 2012).
The third potential way in which dreams are hyperassociative
is in time variance: dreams interweave elements of the past, the
present, and the imagined or anticipated future. For instance,
Cartwright et al. (1984) found that depressed divorcees had
dreams that were often stuck in the past, whereas non-depressed
divorcees’ dreams exhibited more time variance. Given that many
of the theories discussed so far have proposed a mechanism
whereby current information is interweaved during sleep with
pre-existing information, including ‘gist’ memories as well as
more speciﬁc memories (e.g., Breger, 1967;Walker and Stickgold,
2010), it makes sense that dream content that is related to a
heightened ability to assimilate this information (and therefore
cope with it) exhibits time variance. At the other end of the
spectrum are individuals whose ability to assimilate information
has been enormously reduced, such as PTSD patients. One of
the eﬀects of PTSD symptomatology is the appearance of more
general, and less speciﬁc, autobiographical memories (Moore
and Zoellner, 2007), and this ‘overgenerality’ has been found
to apply also when imagining the future (Brown et al., 2013).
Additionally, PTSD patients who were manipulated to believe
they were high in self-eﬃcacy were found to generate memories
and imagined future events with greater speciﬁcity than those
who believed they were low in self-eﬃcacy (Brown et al.,
2012). This, and the evidence from Cartwright’s study in the
previous paragraph, indicate that time variance, as one mode of
hyperassociativity, is crucial to memory integration and emotion
assimilation.
Several studies evidence that dreams respond associatively
to waking-life stimuli. Davidson and Lynch (2011) found
that, after exposure to a video depicting the events of 9/11,
participants had more dreams of material that was literally,
closely and loosely related to material, demonstrating the
hyperassociative pathways active during dreaming. Similarly,
naturalistic post-9/11 studies generally found little evidence for
direct incorporations of the event into dreams, but did ﬁnd
evidence for associated images, themes, and emotions (e.g.,
Hartmann and Basile, 2003; Hartmann and Brezler, 2008).
Domhoﬀ (1993), in commenting on the resurgence of traumatic
dreaming of Vietnam veterans during much later times of
unrelated stress (such as marital diﬃculties), suggested that the
dreams could be metaphorical representations of the present
stress; conversely, perhaps the current stress simply opened up
associative pathways. Similarly, post-traumatic nightmares can
be triggered by a new life event or even a television image
up to 40 years after the traumatic experience (Schreuder et al.,
1998; Schreuder et al., 2000). Given that it is unlikely that
a traumatic nightmare is a metaphorical representation of a
television image, it seems more likely that associative pathways
to the traumatic experience were re-opened by the associated
image.
The fact that dreams involve elements unknown to the
dreamer (such as characters or activities that the dreamer has not
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had direct experience of in waking life) is not evidence against
the notion of these being distant memory associations, because
memory consolidation does not involve merely strengthening
memories for literal recall, but also extraction of the gist of the
memory (Wamsley, 2014). Indeed, we have found that ‘generic’
elements occur frequently in dreams, such that people dream
of recognizable ‘types’ – which come from an amalgamation
of a variety of speciﬁc waking-life memories, but not any
one particular memory – which are akin to ‘extras’ in a ﬁlm
(Malinowski et al., 2014). For example, one participant dreamt
of a generic bookshop and a generic bookshop assistant, which
comes from a combination of various experiences of bookshops
and bookshop assistants, but without being any particular place
or person from memory. Strauch and Meier (1996) call such
generic elements the “building blocks” of dreams.
Functions of Hyperassociativity: Assimilation
Many of the researchers cited in Section “Emotion-Processing
Theories of Dreaming” who postulated emotion-processing
theories of dreaming hypothesize that this process occurs via
hyperassociativity (e.g., Breger, 1967; Hartmann, 1996a; Levin
and Nielsen, 2007; Cartwright, 2011). Breger talked about the
dream providing a context in which mnemonic information
is more freely available to be accessed than during waking;
and moreover, it is available to be accessed in a ﬂuid,
associative manner. This “creative opening up of the memory
systems” (p. 25) is what enables integration of new with old
memories. Llewellyn (2013) postulates that recent episodic
experiences are hippocampal-dependent and are assimilated
into long-term, more stable emotional memory networks
during dreaming. Thus dreaming provides a context in which
experiences can be elaborated, activating relational memories.
Hartmann (1996a) drew similar conclusions, envisaging the
brain as an interconnected network of units, and suggesting
that the ﬂow of information between these units during
waking (especially during directed thought) is linear, and
this is most functional when we are in pursuit of a goal.
However, during dreaming, the ﬂow of information is non-
linear, and may spread laterally into units that are more
loosely connected together; this process is guided by emotion.
Thus, PTSD dreams are a dysfunction of this process, and
are not hyperconnective but are still guided by emotion,
whereas ‘normal’ dreams following trauma are hyperconnective
and guided by the emotion. As the dreams move from
traumatic to normal, they become more hyperconnective, and
thus the original emotion becomes harder to determine. This
process contextualizes the current emotional concern in a
diﬀerent (novel) perspective, and in situations that have been
experienced before. In this view, new material is interweaved
with older material to form new creations, in order to adapt to
experiences.
Functions of Hyperassociativity: Insight
These processes are envisioned to occur primarily during REM
sleep, the stage of sleep most conducive to hyperassociative
thinking. In addition to Cai et al.’s (2009) ﬁndings (see Functions
of Metaphor Generation: Insight), a number of other studies
evidence that REM sleep facilitates hyperassociative thinking,
which may lead to insight. Stickgold et al. (1999) found that
weak priming (e.g., ‘crime’ with ‘gun’) exceeds strong priming
(e.g., ‘hot’ with ‘cold’) after REM sleep, suggesting again that
hyperassociative thinking is occurring during REM sleep. Walker
et al. (2002) found that participants awoken from REM sleepwere
better at solving anagrams than those awoken from NREM sleep,
again demonstrating that REM sleep is conducive to associative
modes of cognition. Recently, Carr and Nielsen (2015) have
shown that a REM-sleep group of participants scored higher
than NREM or wake groups on primed emotional stimuli using
the associational breadth method. Some behavioral paradigms
have demonstrated the overall role of sleep, as opposed to
wake, in enhancing insight into associations between learned
categories (Ellenbogen et al., 2007). Taking the evidence together,
memory researchers posit a complex picture of the brain
during sleep; far from mere consolidation (strengthening) of
memories during sleep, the brain is undergoing a whole host
of memory transformation processes, including assimilation and
integration, abstraction and generalization, selective extraction of
useful information, and generating insights from the information
stored (Payne, 2010; Walker and Stickgold, 2010; Llewellyn,
2013).
In Section “Metaphors and Embodied Cognition” and
“Functions of Metaphor Generation: Assimilation” it was
postulated that metaphor generation may be instrumental in the
novelty- and insight-producing abilities of dreaming. Similarly
hyperassociativity has the potential to produce novelty and
new insights. Kuiken and Smith (1991) suggest that new
meanings are reached in dreams during ‘visual reorientations’:
things changing appearance, sudden scene shifts, the dream self
suddenly realizing something, etc.; things that often typically
make up the categories in content analysis of dream bizarreness
(e.g., Revonsuo and Salmivalli, 1995). This bears relation to
White’s (2014) ﬁndings on counterfactual thinking in dreams:
he found that when the dream self attempts to solve a
problem within a dream, they usually fail. However, when new
information just ‘appears’ in the dream – which can be in the
form of a character suddenly appearing, or new knowledge
suddenly appearing in the dream self ’s mind, or any other
sudden change – this usually helps to move the dream self
forward.
Both Kuiken and Smith’s (1991) and White’s (2014) research
can be interpreted as further evidence for hyperassociativity in
dreams. The sleeping mind already has the information required
to move the dream forward or come to novel understandings,
and this information seems to just ‘appear’ in the dream because
an associative network has suddenly been activated during
sleep; the subjective experience of this is a sudden appearance
of a person or a thought. The importance of the sudden
appearance of something new in a dream is also echoed by Ellis
(personal communication) in relation to PTSD dreams: “[a PTSD
nightmare] repeats and repeats until something new or diﬀerent
happens that can move the process forward as intended.” These
sudden openings to associated information stored somewhere in
the brain may be behind the insight that is generated during
REM sleep. Research is needed to ﬁnd out what the subjective
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experience is behind such insights, but it may be that it is
these sudden changes in dreams, reﬂecting sudden ‘ﬁrings’ of
associative networks.
The Relationship between Hyperassociativity and
Metaphor
Closely related to the idea of hyperassociativity and creativity
are the ideas of connectionism and self-organization. Like
Hartmann (1996a), dream connectionist theorists such as Globus
(1993) discuss the mind as a network of interconnected ‘nodes’
(neurons) that operates under a parallel processing system,
spontaneously reorganizing the entire make-up of the system
in response to input. Relatedly, Antrobus (1993) argues that
memories for things like attributes, objects, and events are stored
as a distributed pattern, which are connected by conceptual
similarities. When a unit has a similarity another unit, those
units have an active, connected relationship (such as ‘leg’ and
‘ﬂexible joint’), but when they are incompatible with another
unit, they have an inhibited, disconnected relationship (such
as ‘leg’ and ‘rigid’). Units with such shared conceptual features
may be more likely to be connected during dreaming, which
enables dreams to be representative or “metaphoric” (p. 81) in
quality.
In this view, associativity and metaphor go hand-in-hand
during sleep/dreaming; thus there should be a relationship
between metaphor and bizarreness, if bizarreness is a
measureable marker of hyperassociativity. We found a very large
positive correlation between self-reported metaphoricalness
and bizarreness in participants’ late-night dreams (r = 0.72)
and a large positive correlation in early night dreams (r = 0.51;
Malinowski and Horton, 2014b). Similarly, since we argue that
the emotion-assimilation function of dreaming is predicated
on imaginational abilities, and that dream bizarreness (for
hyperassociativity) is one of these abilities, it would be expected
that bizarreness and emotional intensity are also positively
correlated. There were medium-to-strong positive correlations
between emotional intensity and bizarreness in both late-
night dreams (r = 0.46) and early night dreams (r = 0.38).
Future research should look into whether these correlations are
particular to positive or negative emotions, to throw further
light onto whether it is particularly negative emotions that are
required to be assimilated via the imaginational properties of
dreaming, or whether positive emotions are equally dreamt of in
this way.
Temporal Effects of Hyperassociativity
Hyperassociativity may also be evident as a long-term, iterative
process, as has been discussed, and illustrates how dream
incorporation and adaptation occur after the new emotional
experience has been activated, both across multiple nights and
within a single night. Blagrove et al. (2011a,b) have replicated
the ﬁndings of Nielsen and Powell (1992) regarding the dream-
lag eﬀect: that is, waking-life experiences tend to appear in
dreams the night immediately after they have occurred, and
then not again until 5–7 days later; but on second appearance,
the dream incorporates the experience in a more abstract way.
This could be evidence for the experience being interweaved
into the wider memory system, i.e., connections being made
between the new information, established information, and
imagination. More recently, van Rijn et al. (2015) have found
that the dream-lag eﬀect only exists for personally signiﬁcant
events, and not major daily activities or major concerns.
This is important because ‘personally signiﬁcant event’ implies
emotional in both positive and negative ways, whereas ‘major
daily activities’ implies everyday, neutral experiences, and
‘major concerns’ implies speciﬁcally negative thoughts and
experiences.
Within a single night, several stage of sleep and time of
night eﬀects have been found in dreams: REM dreams and
those toward the end of the night tend to become longer,
more vivid, more emotional, and more bizarre (Hobson et al.,
2000; Wamsley et al., 2007; Malinowski and Horton, 2014b),
although REM and NREM dreams become more similar as the
night progresses (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Similarly Wamsley
et al. (2010) found that incorporation of waking life experiences
increased in abstraction with duration of sleep. Cartwright also
found (Section “Cartwright: The Emotion Regulation Function
of Dreaming”) that dreamers who achieve emotional adaptation
tend to start out dreaming in negative tones in the early night
and end up in positive tones in the late night. Thus a picture
begins to build for dreaming across the night, where bizarreness,
emotional intensity, and emotional valence change as the night
goes on. More research is required to get a fuller picture of these
changes, considering metaphor also (Malinowski and Horton,
unpublished manuscript).
Similarly, time of night inﬂuences memory consolidation
during sleep, such that episodic memories tend to be
preferentially consolidated during NREM sleep in the earlier
portion of the night, and procedural and emotional memories
during REM sleep in the later portion of the night (Plihal and
Born, 1997; Payne, 2010). Such evidence has led some researchers
to propose a memory consolidation theory of sleep whereby slow
wave sleep (SWS) initially consolidates recent episodic material
(such as from the previous day), and REM sleep integrates and
abstracts it (e.g., Giudatta et al., 1995, see also Llewellyn, 2013).
Such theorizing is in line with the dream research ﬁndings,
since early night (SWS) dreams tend to reﬂect current concerns,
and later night (often REM) dreams tend to be more bizarre,
which may mean they are more hyperassociative, as above. This
in turn may reﬂect the subjective experience of the memory
integration function of REM sleep. Whilst we recognize that
dreams from late-night sleep are typically more bizarre than
those elicited from early night sleep, we are not in a position to
postulate that the emotion assimilation processes are speciﬁcally
REM-dependent. Rather, they may require both non-REM and
REM processing (Ellenbogen et al., 2007; Cairney et al., 2014), or
be a function of time spent asleep.
At the chemical level, these time of night changes in
hyperassociativity may be understood as a function of the
circadian cycle of the stress hormone cortisol (Payne, 2010).
Traumatic experiences, which are accompanied by the release
of cortisol, are often fragmented and lack coherence, with
little episodic or contextual information retained. Conversely,
emotional material is ‘stamped in’; the resultant eﬀects are
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either disjointed memory fragments, or memories that undergo
“narrative smoothing” (p. 117), the latter of which is similar to
the synthesis of memory fragments into a narrative in dreams.
Thus, since levels of cortisol increase across the night and peak
in the late morning, so dreaming becomes more fragmented and
bizarre across the night, peaking in the late morning.
Hyperassociativity during sleep/dreaming, then, appears to
index one of the stages of memory consolidation during
sleep: that is, the stage during which memories are integrated,
which happens during late-night, predominantly REM, sleep.
During this stage of the memory consolidation process, recent
memories are activated and associated with other information
already stored in the memory system. There is widespread
evidence for hyperassociativity occurring during sleep, such
as the insight generated following REM sleep compared to
NREM and wakefulness; likewise there is widespread evidence
for hyperassociativity during dreaming, such as time variance
in dreams, the activation of associated memories following
exposure to stimuli, and the fragmentariness and bizarreness
of some, particularly late-night, dreams. Several researchers
conceptualize the mind in this state as a series of interconnected
nodes, activating in parallel rather than the more sequential, or
linear, mode of thought common to focused waking cognition.
Hyperassociativity, like metaphor, has the potential to create
novel insights. It increases over time, both within a single night
(bizarreness increases toward the end of the night and episodic
replayings of memories decrease; this may be seen at the chemical
level in increases in cortisol), and across many nights (abstraction
increases with repeated incorporations, as evidenced by dream-
lag studies).
Suggestions for Future Directions
As we have emphasized throughout, theories of emotional
processing during sleep could beneﬁt from exploring dream
content, and theories of dreaming could beneﬁt from considering
the behavioral and neurological proﬁle of the sleeping brain.
In practice empirical studies from the sleep lab need to be
followed up with dream studies. Dreams can be studied as
transparent reﬂections of sleep-dependent memory processes
(Wamsley, 2014), provided they are sampled under ideal
conditions (Windt, 2013), taking heed from the systematic
and rigorous methodologies typifying sleep science (Kahan and
Horton, 2012). More speciﬁcally, there are some aspects of our
proposed emotion assimilation theory that would beneﬁt from
greater exploration. The time-course of the emotion assimilation
processes is as yet understudied, with the domains of sleep
science and dreaming sometimes focusing on diﬀerent levels of
enquiry, with sleep-labs typically exploring shorter time frames,
from naps (e.g., Payne et al., 2015) to around 24 h periods
(Ellenbogen et al., 2007) compared to some longer-term dream
studies (e.g., Cartwright’s divorcee studies, Section “Cartwright:
The Emotion Regulation Function of Dreaming.”) Similarly the
role of REM sleep, in particular, requires further consideration
in the selection of emotional information, and its subsequent
consolidation.
The diﬀerential eﬀects of positive and negative emotions
in the consolidation and assimilation process should also be
parsed out. Kensinger (2009) has reviewed the eﬀects of emotion
on (non-sleep-dependent) memory processes, and found that
while emotion has a beneﬁcial eﬀect for memory whether it is
positive or negative, the beneﬁts are diﬀerent: positively valenced
memories are more likely to be remembered in terms of the
gist of the memory, whereas negatively valenced memories are
more likely to recalled in speciﬁc detail. That is, she found
a link between negative emotion and sensory processing on
the one hand, and positive emotion and conceptual processing
on the other. These eﬀects should be investigated in terms of
the eﬀects of diﬀerently valenced memories and sleep, and the
phenomenology of these eﬀects during sleep by investigating
dream content.
Dream science can be particularly insightful in terms of the
study of metaphors and associations between memory elements
to reﬂect assimilation. It has been over 10 years since Domhoﬀ’s
(2003) suggestion that inductive qualitative methods, followed
up with objective quantitative methods, are used to study dream
metaphors in depth, but few researchers have broached this
topic yet. More research is needed to investigate the conscious
experiences of assimilation that occur during sleep in dreams,
and dream metaphor, hyperassociativity, and bizarreness may
provide starting points. Similarly, dream content may be fruitful
in the study of other memory processes during sleep, such as gist
extraction and insight generation.
Finally, links between dream content and more general
memory behaviors are needed, such as exploring dream content
from periods of successful consolidation (versus less successful
consolidation) and, where possible, identifying speciﬁc links
between dream content and enhanced recall of those memories
activated in dreams (as in Horton, 2012). More generally,
exploring the content of dreams taken from sleep that enhances
creativity, insight or problem solving may also shed light on
the sleep-dependent processes that give rise to such successful
cognitive functioning.
Conclusion
We have proposed (i) that emotion acts as a marker for
information to be selectively processed during sleep, including
consolidation into long term memory structures and integration
into pre-existing memory networks, (ii) that dreaming reﬂects
these processes of emotion assimilation, and (iii) that the
associations between memory fragments activated during sleep
give rise to measureable elements of dream metaphor and
hyperassociativity (e.g., time variance and bizarreness). In turn,
these elements indicate the time-course of emotion assimilation,
with greater bizarreness signifying greater distance from the
original emotionality of the experience, in turn indicating more
advanced assimilation.
These processes directly compliment the proposed model
of autobiographical memory functioning in the sleeping
brain (Horton and Malinowski, 2015) which describes how
waking-life elements are broken down into fragments,
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subsequently re-bound together via hyperassociativity during
sleep, and manifest in bizarre experiences of dreams and the
metaphorical representation of salient and emotional waking life
experiences. In our emotion assimilation theory we emphasize
how emotion during sleep can function to improve the retention
and retrievability of salient experiences so we can make use
of them better in the future. Taken together, experiences
and information from waking life can be broken down for
oﬄine ﬁling during sleep, and activated as part of that
process. Associated emotionality of those memory fragments
leads to heightened activation, in turn resulting in further
hyperassociativity, and as such a stronger memory consolidation
process ensues.
Currently there is not enough evidence to make the
claim that experiencing dreaming contributes to emotional
assimilation directly; rather, dreaming can be taken to reﬂect the
activation of memories whilst the brain’s sensitivity to external
stimuli is lessened (Murkar et al., 2014). Dreaming provides a
methodological tool for exploring cognitive processing during
sleep, though at this stage we are not able to measure the
additional value of dreaming versus not-dreaming to these
processes. (See Kahan and Horton, 2012, for a brief review of
dreaming as a methodological tool.) We assume that dreaming
occurs in the vast majority of individuals each night during sleep,
though being able to remember one’s dreams is independent of
the sleeping brain’s ability to assimilate emotional material into
pre-existing networks. Further, although we propose that sleep
may serve the function of assimilating emotional information
into a stable, organized network of personal and semantic
information, we make no claims about this being sleep’s only,
or even main, function. Similarly, we recognize that sleep has
evolved and its primary functions likely changed, with functions
such as emotion assimilation being a consequence of a rapidly
evolving and stimulated human brain in everyday contexts.
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